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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
tomers of another or to the trade generally an account of a court proceeding
which is misleading, the continuance of such practice may be enjoined.
Asbestos Shingle Co. v. Johns-Manville Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1911) 189 Fed.
611; Rollman Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works (C. C. A. 3, 1916)
238 Fed. 568; Gerosa v. Apeo Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 1, 1924) 299 Fed. 19;
Price Hollister Co. v. Warlord Corporation (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1926) 18
Fed. (2nd) 129; Haver Co. v. Sesquicentennial Exhibition Association (D. C.
E. D. Pa., 1928) 26 Fed. (2nd) 821; Gardner Sign Co. v. Claude Neon Lights,
Inc. (D. C. W. D. Pa., 1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 827. The courts in creating these
exceptions based their decisions on a tenuous property interest in the com-
plainants.
Two recent cases, Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1929)
35 Fed. (2nd) 403 and Dehydro Inc. v. Tr'eotlite Co. (D. C. N. D. Okla.,
1931) 53 Fed. (2nd) 273, held that such actions as these are not actions to
enjoin a libel or slander but rather to enjoin a party from committing acts
constituting unfair competition, and from destroying the plaintiff's business.
See Walsh, On Equity, 267. The principal case could have been decided
along the same lines. By not doing so the Court seems to be out of line with
the modern tendency.
The exceptions tend to show that the courts are not in sympathy with
the alleged rule "equity will not enjoin a libel" and they are willing to
bring about the opposite result by indirect means. The courts have still
failed to take the direct course because of precedent.
0. J. G. '37.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE ON JUDIcIAL
RzvIEW OF DECISION.-The Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order
prescribing divisions, between northern and southern carriers, of through
rates on citrus fruit from Florida points to destinations in official classifi-
cation territory. The northern carriers sued in equity to enjoin, set aside,
and annul these orders on the ground that the prescribed divisions were
confiscatory. The court dismissed the petitions but in so doing, held, that
in considering the issue of confiscation the court is not limited to evidence
introduced before the Commission. It entertained additional evidence upon
this issue. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. United States, (D. C. E. D. Va.
1934) 9 Fed. Supp. 181.
Though at first, in accordance with the Statute, (24 Stat. 384, [1887], 49
U. S. C. A. 16) the Supreme Court gave to the findings of fact by the
Commission the effect only of prima facie evidence, I. C. C. v. Ala. Midland
R. Co. (1897) 164 U. S. 144, it stressed the importance of having all the
facts disclosed before the Commission and expressly disapproved any method
of procedure on the part of the railroads which led them to withhold part
of their evidence from the Commission and to produce it for the first time
in the courts. Cin., N. 0. & Tex. Pac. B. v. L C. C. (1896) 162 U. S. 184,
196; Texas & P. R. Co. v. I. C. C. (1896) 162 U. S. 197. As cases became in-
creasingly numerous the courts realized more and more the expediency of
having the Commission pass upon the intricate questions of fact. The Hep-
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burn Amendment (34 Stat. 584, 591 [1906,] 49 U. S. C. A. 1) as to enforce-
ment of non-reparation orders, left the scope of judicial review entirely un-
defined and provided, "and the court shall prosecute such inquiries and make
such investigations, through such means as it shall deem needful in the ascer-
tainment of the facts at issue or which may arise upon the hearing of such
petition. If, upon such hearing as the court may determine to be necessary,
it appears that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the
carrier is in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce obedience to
such order by a writ of injunction, or other proper process, mandatory or
otherwise... ." Nor was the scope of review defined as to injunction pro-
ceedings to set aside an order of the Commission. 36 Stat. 542 (1910) ; 38
Stat. 220 (1913). The court took this opportunity to view the findings of
fact by the Commission as conclusively correct and confined itself to deter-
mining whether, in the light of those findings from the facts presented
before the Commission, the order involved a violation of the Constitution,
a want of conformity to statutory authority, or such an arbitrary exercise
of power as to transcend the authority conferred. Proctor and Gamble Co.
v. United States (1912) 225 U. S. 282. The court cannot rehear the case
and retry questions of fact. Neither can it review or revise the discretion
of the Commission where discretion is allowed by law; it can only approve
or disapprove for the reasons mentioned. The matter is heard in court
solely on the record, as in an ordinary error proceeding, and no new evi-
dence is admissible. United States v. L. & N. R. Co. (1914) 235 U. S. 314;
I. C. C. v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1912) 222 U. S. 541; 1. C. C. v. Ill. Cent. R.
(1910) 215 U. S. 452.
However, since as regards reparation proceedings the Hepburn Amend-
ment left statutory language unchanged, the Court has held itself bound
by the words, "shall be prima facie evidence," (34 Stat. at. L. 584, 590,
1906) and a trial de novo is allowed. Penn. R. Co. v. Minds (1910) 250
U. S. 368; Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1915) 238 U. S. 473.
The prevailing line of decisions has held that while the legislature can-
not withhold from the courts the power of judicial review of facts bearing
upon questions of constitutional right, such review is confined to the evi-
dence introduced before the Commission, and if any new evidence is dis-
covered the case should be remanded to the administrative body. Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287; Tagg Bros.
and Moorhead v. United States (1930) 280 U. S. 420; Dayton-Goose Creeo
R. Co. v. United States (1924) 236 U. S. 456; Bluefield Co. v. Public Service
Com. (1923) 262 U. S. 679. A break in this line of decisions is Crowell v.
Benson (1931) 285 U. S. 22, which granted a trial de novo as to findings,
by the United States Compensation Commission, of questions of "jurisdic-
tional" fact in the awarding of reparation. As was recognized by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in a vigorous .dissent, the Ohio Valley Case, supra, was
improperly relied upon by the Court as supporting the holding that a trial
de novo in court of fact questions bearing upon the issue of confiscation is
required. Crowell v. Benson, supra, at p. 91. The limited effect of this case
was quickly recognized. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co. (1933) 288 U. S. 162;
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Green v. Crowell, Deputy Com'r (1934) 69 Fed. (2nd) 762; Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. v. Monahan (1932) 57 Fed. (2nd) 217; Kropp v. Parker
(1934) 8 Fed. Supp. 290. In Krentz et al. v. Durning (1934) 69 Fed. (2nd)
802, 804, the court said, "were not its scope (Crowell v. Benson) so con-
fined, it would have overthrown the accepted procedure of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Shipping Board,
the Board of Tax Appeals, and we should suppose, the assessment of dam-
ages in admiralty by a commissioner."
The present case relies on Mfr's R. v. United States (1918) 246 U. S.
457, at 480-490, as holding that new evidence is admissible on the issue of
confiscation. In that case the United States contended that the findings of
the Commission upon the subject of confiscation were not subject to attack
upon evidence not presented to the Commission. The Court said, "We can
not sustain this objection in its entirety." It went on to say, that though
correct practice required that all pertinent evidence should first be sub-
mitted to the Commission, and that thus it could not approve the proce-
dure in this case, since the issue of confiscation was in the case the Court
should deal with it. Except in this doubtful precedent, it has been held, in
non-reparation cases, that the courts are limited to a review of the evidence
taken before the Commission. United States v. L. & N. R. Co., supra;
1. C. C. v. Union Pao. R. Co., supra; L. & N. R. Co. v. United States (1914)
218 Fed. 89; Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild (1912) 224 U. S. 510;
I. C. C. v. IlL. Cent. R. Co. (1910) 215 U. S. 452. Thus it seems that the
court in the principal case has relied upon a solitary case rather than upon
much more clearly defined counter authority.
P. A. M. '36.
ORAL CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-NOT TO BE PERFORMED IN ONE
YEAR.-Plaintiff sued defendant on an oral promise to pay a note of de-
fendant's brother, renewed for one year, from proceeds of an insurance
policy insuring the life of his brother, when received by the promisor as
beneficiary, if the maker died before the end of a year. Held, that the oral
promise was invalidated by the statute of frauds provision adopted in New
York in April, 1933 (chap. 616 of Laws of 1933, amending sec. 31 of the
Personal Property Laws), which provision declares void all agreements not
in writing "performance of which is not to be completed before the end of
a lifetime." Terminello v. Bleecker (July, 1935) 280 N. Y. Supp. 326.
The instant case is the first reported case to adjudicate upon the statute
as amended, and the case is directly within the provisions of the act since
the alleged promise did not become operative until the death of the promi-
sor's brother, therefore, the performance of the contract by the promisor
was not to be completed before the end of the maker's lifetime.
The statutes of most jurisdictions do not include such a provision: (that
they do not) see R. S. Mo. 1929 sec. 2967; Cahill's Ill. Rev. Statutes, chap.
59, sec. 1; but provide only that contracts not to be performed within one
year, to be valid, must be in writing. Most jurisdictions, therefore, hold
that where an obligation is to continue during the lifetime of a specified
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